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Abstract: The division of a cake by n players is modeled as a game of timing. We show that
such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
There are many strategic situations in which some agents face a decision problem in which
timing is important. The literature on timing games has been devoted to analyze these
situations and provide theoretical models to study the underlying strategic problem. A ﬁrst
approach to timing games appears in S.Karlin (1959) in the zero sum context. More recent
contributions are Baston and Garnaev (2000) and Laraki et al. (2003). A classic example
of timing game is the war of attrition, introduced in Smith (1974) and widely studied, for
instance, in Hendricks et al. (1988). More speciﬁcally, consider the following war of attrition
game. Two rival ﬁrms are engaged in a race to make a patentable discovery, and hence, as
soon as one ﬁrm makes the discovery, all the previous eﬀort made by the other ﬁrm turns
out to be useless. This patent race model has been widely studied in literature (see, for
instance, Fudenberg et al. (1983)). In this model it is assumed that, as soon as one of the
ﬁrms leaves the race, the game ends. The motivation for this assumption is that, once there
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1is only one ﬁrm in the race, the game reduces to a decision problem in which the remaining
ﬁrm has to optimize its resources. Hence, the strategy of each ﬁrm consists of deciding, for
each time t, whether to leave the race or not. Most of the literature in timing games models
what we call non-silent timing games, that is, as soon as one player acts, the others are
informed and the game ends.1 In this paper, on the contrary, we provide a formal model
for the silent situation. We use again the patent race to motivate our approach. Consider
a situation in which two ﬁrms are engaged in a patent race and also in an advertising
campaign. Suppose that one of the two rival ﬁrms, say ﬁrm 1, decides to leave the patent
race. Then, it will probably be the case that ﬁrm 1 does not want ﬁrm 2 to realize that 1
not in the race anymore; and therefore, ﬁrm 1 can get a more advantageous position for the
advertising campaign. Moreover, if ﬁrm 2 does not realize about the fact that ﬁrm 1 has
already left the race, it can also be the case that, having already ﬁrm 1 left the race, ﬁrm
2 leaves the race before making the discovery, beneﬁtting again ﬁrm 1.
Next, we introduce our silent timing game. We consider the situation that n players
have to divide a cake of size S. At time 0 player i has the initial right to receive the amount
αi, where it is assumed that
 
i∈N αi < S. If player i claims his part at time t > 0 then he
receives the discounted part δtαi of the cake, unless he is the last claimant in which case he
receives the discounted remaining part of the cake δt(S −
 
j =i αj). We refer to this game
as a cake sharing game.
Hamers (1993) showed that 2-person cake sharing games always admit a unique Nash
equilibrium. In this paper we consider cake sharing games that are slightly diﬀerent from
the games introduced in Hamers (1993). We ﬁrst provide an alternative, but more direct,
existence and uniqueness result for 2-player cake sharing games and we generalize this result
to cake sharing games with more players.
It is worth to mention the similarities between our results and some well known results
in all-pay auctions (Weber, 1985). At ﬁrst glance, our model seems quite diﬀerent from that
of all-pay auctions, but, it turns out to be the case that they have many similarities. Indeed,
in this paper we show that the same kind of results obtained for the all-pay auction (Arye
L. Hilman, 1989; Michael R. Baye, 1996) can be obtained for our timing game. Anyhow,
even when both the results and also the arguments underlying some of the proofs are very
1An exception is Reinganum (1981), although her model is very diﬀerent from ours.
2similar, the two models are diﬀerent enough so that our results can not be derived from
those in the all-pay auctions literature.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce cake sharing games. In
Sections 3 and 4 we deal with 2-player cake sharing games and more player cake sharing
games, respectively.
2 The Model
In this section we formally introduce the cake sharing games.
Let N = {1,...,n} be a set of players with n ≥ 2, let S > 0, let α = (α1,...,αn) ∈ RN
+
be such that α1 +     + αn < S and let δ ∈ (0,1). Throughout this paper we assume that
0 < α1 < α2 <     < αn. The number S is called the size of the cake, the vector α the
initial right vector and δ the discount factor.
The cake sharing game with pure strategies, associated with S, α and δ, is the triple
Γ
pure
S,α,δ =  N,{Ai}i∈N,{πi}i∈N , where
• Ai = [0,∞) is the set of pure strategies of player i ∈ N,












So, if there is a unique last claimant this player will receive the discounted value of the
cake that remains after that the other players have taken their initial rights. If there is not
a unique last claimant all players receive the discounted value of their initial rights. Note
that the payoﬀ functions deﬁned above diﬀer slightly from the payoﬀ functions introduced
in Hamers (1993), where, in case there is not a unique last claimant, the discounted value
of the remaining cake is shared equally between the last claimants.2
2Let us make some coments concerning the relation between the cake sharing game (CS) and the all-pay
auctions model (AP). For simplicity, we think of the two player case. Setting aside the issue of timing,
note the following diﬀerences: (i) Initial rights: in CS they depend on the player (αi), in AP they are 0;
(ii) in CS each player wants to get 1 −(α1 + α2), in AP the valuation of the object depends on the player;
and (iii) In CS waiting till time t, each player is “paying” αi −(αi)δt, i.e., it depends on the player, in AP
bidding v, each player is “paying” v. All the other strategic elements are analogous in the two models.
3One easily veriﬁes that Γ
pure
S,α,δ has no Nash equilibria: if there is a unique last claimant
this player can improve his payoﬀ by claiming a little bit earlier (remaining the last claimant
of course), if there is no unique last claimant then one of the last claimants can improve his
payoﬀ by claiming a little bit later (becoming the unique last claimant in this way). So, for
an appropriate analysis of cake sharing games we need to consider mixed strategies.
Formally, a mixed strategy is a function G : [0,∞) → [0,1] satisfying:
• G(0) = 0,
• G is a nondecreasing function,
• G is left-continuous,
• limx→∞ G(x) = 1.






for all x ∈ [0,∞). On the other hand, every probability measure P on [0,∞) deﬁnes by
formula (1) a mixed strategy G. So the set of mixed strategies coincides with the set of
probability measures on [0,∞).4 Let G denote the set of all mixed strategies. We introduce
now some other notations related to mixed strategy G:
• for x ∈ [0,∞) we denote limy↓x G(y), the probability of choosing an element in the
closed interval [0,x], by G(x+).
• if for an x > 0 it holds that for every a,b ∈ [0,∞) with a < x < b we have G(b) >
G(a+), i.e., the probability of choosing an element in (a,b) is positive, then x is an
element of the support of G. If for every b > 0 it holds that G(b) > 0, i.e., the
probability of choosing an element in [0,b) is positive, then 0 is an element of the
support of G. The support of the distribution function G will be denoted by S(G).
One easily veriﬁes that S(G) is a closed set.
3See V.K.Rohatgi (1976) for more details.
4An alternative way of deﬁning mixed strategies G is as a nondecreasing, right-continuous function from
[0,∞) to [0,1] with limx→∞ G(x) = 1. For such a function we can always ﬁnd a probability measure P




for all x ∈ [0,∞), i.e., G is the (cumulative) distribution function
corresponding to P. Although this equivalent approach seems more natural, this would lead to technical
problems when computing Lebesgue-Stieltjes integrals later on.
4• the set of jumps (discontinuities) of G is J(G) := {x ∈ [0,∞) | G(x+) > G(x)}, i.e.,
the set of pure strategies which are chosen with positive probability.
If player i chooses pure strategy t and all other players choose mixed strategies {Gj}j =i





Gj(t)   δt   (S −
 
j =i
αj) + (1 −
 
j =i
Gj(t))   δt   αi







If player i also chooses a mixed strategy Gi, whereas all other players stick to mixed strate-





Note that, with a slight abuse of notation, the functions πi do not only denote payoﬀs to
players when pure strategies are played, but also when mixed strategies are used.
The cake sharing game, associated with S, α and δ, is deﬁned by the triple ΓS,α,δ =
 N,{Xi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N , where
• Xi = G is the set of mixed strategies of player i ∈ N,
• πi, deﬁned by (2), is the (expected) payoﬀ function of player i ∈ N.
Given a strategy proﬁle G = (G1,G2,...,Gn) ∈ Gn, let πG
i (t) denote the payoﬀ
πi(G1,...,Gi−1,t,Gi+1,...,Gn). So πG
i (t) is the expected payoﬀ of player i when he
chooses the pure strategy t and all the other players act in accordance with G.
3 Two Players
In this section we provide an alternative proof of the result of Hamers (1993) for 2-player
cake sharing games. Our incentives for doing this job are threefold. First of all we want to
recall that our model is slightly diﬀerent from the model of Hamers (1993), so a new proof
5is required. Secondly, our proof is more direct than Hamers’ proof. Finally, our proof will
form the basis for the results in Section 4 for cake sharing games with three or more players.
First we derive a number of properties for Nash equilibria of n-player cake sharing
games. The following lemma shows that in a Nash equilibrium players do not put positive
probability on a pure strategy t > 0.
Lemma 1. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game and let the proﬁle G = (Gi)i∈N ∈
GN be a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Then J(Gi) ∩ (0,∞) = ∅ for every i ∈ N.
Proof. Let i ∈ N. We will show that J(Gi) ∩ (0,∞) = ∅. Without loss of generality we
may assume that i = 1.
Suppose that u ∈ J(G1) ∩ (0,∞). If Gi(u+) = 0 for some i  = 1 then πG
1 (t) = δtα1
whenever t ∈ [0,u]. Since the function πG
1 ( ) is strictly decreasing on [0,u], player 1 would
be better oﬀ moving the probability in u to 0. So Gi(u+) > 0 for all i ∈ N. Now consider
the functions
πG







for i ∈ N\{1}. Since G1 is discontinuous at u, i.e., G1(u+) > G1(u), there exist u1 < u,
u2 > u and ε > 0 such that for every i  = 1
πG
i (u2) − πG
i (t) ≥ ε for every t ∈ [u1,u].
If player i ∈ N\{1} puts positive probability on [u1,u], i.e., if Gi(u+) > Gi(u1), then he can
increase his payoﬀ by at least ε(Gi(u+) − Gi(u1)) by moving all this probability to u2. So
for all i ∈ N\{1} we have Gi(u+) = Gi(u1) and hence Gi(t) = Gi(u) for every t ∈ [u1,u].
Therefore the function
πG







is strictly decreasing on [u1,u]. So player 1 can improve his payoﬀ by moving some proba-
bility from u to u1.
Lemma 1 implies that in a Nash equilibrium G players use mixed strategies which are
continuous on (0,∞). Therefore we may write Gi(t+) = Gi(t) for every i ∈ N and t > 0.
Moreover, the functions πG
i ( ) are continuous on (0,∞).
6Lemma 2. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game and let the proﬁle G = (Gi)i∈N ∈
GN be a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Let i ∈ N and t ∈ S(Gi). There exists j ∈ N\{i} such
that t ∈ S(Gj).
Proof. Suppose that t / ∈ ∪j =iS(Gj). We will distinguish between two cases:
Case (i): t > 0. There exist t1,t2 > 0 with t1 < t < t2 such that Gj(t2) = Gj(t1) for all
j  = i.5 Hence Gj(u) = Gj(t2) for every u ∈ [t1,t2] and every j  = i. Therefore the function
πG







is strictly decreasing on [t1,t2]. Since t ∈ S(Gi) we have Gi(t2) > Gi(t
+
1 ), i.e., player i puts
positive probability on (t1,t2). Now player i can strictly improve his payoﬀ by moving all
this probability to t1.
Case (ii): t = 0. Let b > 0 be the smallest element in ∪j =iS(Gj) (recall that all the
S(Gj) are closed). Clearly Gj(b) = 0 for all j  = i. Again, if Gi(b) > Gi(0+), i.e., if player
i puts positive probability on (0,b), then similar arguments as in Case (i) can be used
to show that player i can strictly improve his payoﬀ by moving this probability to 0. So
Gi(b) = Gi(0+) and hence, since 0 ∈ S(Gi), we have Gi(0+) > 0. Moreover Gi(t) = Gi(b)
for every t ∈ (0,b] (this is relevant only for the case n = 2), so
πG







is strictly decreasing on (0,b] for every j ∈ N\{i}.
Let a ∈ (0,b) and let j ∈ N\{i} be a player such that b ∈ S(Gj). Clearly ε := πG
j (a) −
πG
j (b) > 0. Since the function πG
j ( ) is continuous on (0,∞) we have, for δ > 0 suﬃciently
small,
πG




ε for every t ∈ [b,b + δ].
Since b ∈ S(Gj) we have Gj(b + δ) > 0 = Gj(b). So, player j can improve his payoﬀ by
moving the probability he assigns to [b,b + δ) to a. Contradiction.
The following lemma shows that if some pure strategy t does not belong to the support
of any of the equilibrium strategies, then no pure strategy t′ > t belongs to the support of
any of the equilibrium strategies either.




2 > 0 with t
j
1 < t < t
j





take t1 = maxj∈N\{i} t
j
1 and t2 = minj∈N\{i} t
j
2.
7Lemma 3. Let G = (Gi)i∈N be a Nash equilibrium of the n-player cake sharing game
ΓS,α,δ. Suppose t ∈ [0,∞) is such that t / ∈ S(Gj) for every j ∈ N. Then (t,∞)∩S(Gj) = ∅
for every j ∈ N.
Proof. Deﬁne K = ∪j∈NS(Gj). Clearly K is closed and t / ∈ K. We have to show that
K ∩ (t,∞) = ∅. Suppose that K ∩ (t,∞)  = ∅. Deﬁne t∗ = min{u ∈ K|u > t}. Let
j∗ ∈ N be such that t∗ ∈ S(Gj∗). Because [t,t∗) ∩ S(Gj) = ∅ for every j ∈ N we have
Gj(t) = Gj(t∗) for every j ∈ N. So the functions Gj are constant on [t,t∗]. Since
πG







for every u ∈ [0,∞), the function πG
j∗( ) is strictly decreasing on [t,t∗]. By continuity of
πG
j∗( ) at t∗ we infer that πG
j∗(t) > πG
j∗(u) for every u ∈ [t∗,t∗ + ε], with ε > 0 suﬃciently
small. Hence Gj∗ is constant on [t∗,t∗ +ε] as well, contradicting the fact that t∗ ∈ S(Gj∗).
Now we provide speciﬁc results for 2-player cake sharing games. The following lemma
shows that in a Nash equilibrium players use mixed strategies of which the supports coincide.
Lemma 4. Let ΓS,α,δ be a 2-player cake sharing game and let (G1,G2) ∈ G ×G be a Nash
equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Then S(G1) = S(G2).
Proof. This result is just a consequence of Lemma 2.
In the following lemma we will show that the supports of the strategies in a Nash
equilibrium are compact intervals.
Lemma 5. Let ΓS,α,δ be a 2-player cake sharing game and let G = (G1,G2) ∈ G × G be a
Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Let k := logδ
α2
S−α1. Then S(G1) = S(G2) = [0,k].
Proof. First we will show that S(G1) = S(G2) ⊆ [0,k]. For every t ∈ (k,∞) we have
πG
2 (t) = δt(α2 + (S − α1 − α2)G1(t))
≤ δt(α2 + (S − α1 − α2))
= δt(S − α1)




8If G2(k) = G2(k+) < 1, i.e., if player 2 puts positive probability on (k,∞), he can improve
his payoﬀ strictly by moving all this probability to 0. Therefore G2(k) = 1 and hence
S(G1) = S(G2) ⊆ [0,k].
Let k∗ be the largest element in the closed set S(G1). Clearly k∗ ≤ k. If k∗ = 0 then
(G1,G2) would be an equilibrium in pure strategies, a contradiction. So k∗ > 0. According
to Lemma 3 we have S(G1) = S(G2) = [0,k∗].
The only thing which remains to be shown is that k∗ = k. Suppose that k∗ < k. For
τ ∈ (0,k − k∗) we have
πG
1 (k∗ + τ) = δk
∗+τ(α1 + (S − α1 − α2)G2(k∗ + τ))
= δk
∗+τ(α1 + (S − α1 − α2))
= δk
∗+τ(S − α2)







where at the weak inequality we used that α2(S−α2) ≥ α1(S−α1). So, if G1(0+) > 0, i.e.,
if player 1 plays pure strategy 0 with positive probability, then he can improve his payoﬀ
by moving some probability from 0 to pure strategy k∗ + τ. Therefore G1(0+) = 0. For
some t ∈ (k∗,k) we have
πG
2 (t) = δt(α2 + (S − α1 − α2)G1(t))
= δt(α2 + (S − α1 − α2))
= δt(S − α1)




Since 0 ∈ S(G1) and πG
2 ( ) is continuous at 0 (due to G1(0+) = 0) player 2 can improve his
payoﬀ strictly by moving some probability from the neighborhood of 0 to t. Contradiction,
so k∗ = k.
Now we are able to prove the main theorem of this section.












δt(S − α1 − α2)
if 0 ≤ t ≤ k




    
    
0 if t = 0
α2(S − α2) − α1(S − α1)δt
δt(S − α1)(S − α1 − α2)
if 0 < t ≤ k
1 if t > k














    
    
α1 if t = 0
α2(S − α2)
S − α1
if 0 < t ≤ k








α2 if 0 ≤ t ≤ k

















for every t ∈ [0,∞) we infer that G∗ is a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ.
In order to show that there are no other Nash equilibria let (G1,G2) be a Nash equilib-
rium of ΓS,α,δ. According to Lemma 1 the strategies G1 and G2 are continuous on (0,∞).
In the same way as in the proof of Lemma 5 we can show that G1(0+) = 0. So, the function
πG
1 ( ) is continuous on (0,∞) and the function πG
2 ( ) is continuous on [0,∞). By Lemma 5
we have S(G1) = S(G2) = [0,k]. So, there exist constants c and d such that
c = πG
1 (t) = δt(α1 + (S − α1 − α2)G2(t)) for every t ∈ (0,k]
d = πG
2 (t) = δt(α2 + (S − α1 − α2)G1(t)) for every t ∈ [0,k].
10Since G1(0) = 0 we have d = πG
2 (0) = α2, from which we derive that
G1(t) =
α2 − α2δt
δt(S − α1 − α2)
= G∗
1(t)
for every t ∈ [0,k]. Clearly, G1(t) = 1 = G∗
1(t) for every t > k, so G1 = G∗
1. Moreover,
since G2(k) = 1 we have c = πG
1 (k) = δk(S − α2) =
α2(S−α2)
S−α1 , from which we derive that
G2(t) =
α2(S − α2) − α1(S − α1)δt
δt(S − α1)(S − α1 − α2)
= G∗
2(t)
for every t ∈ (0,k]. Clearly G2(0) = 0 = G∗
2(0) and G2(t) = 1 = G∗
2(t) for every t > k, so
G2 = G∗
2. This ﬁnishes the proof.
4 More players
In this section we consider cake sharing games with more than two players. Again we will
show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.
First we show that mixed strategies in a Nash equilibrium have a bounded support.
Lemma 6. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game with n ≥ 3 and let G = (Gi)i∈N ∈







Then k1 > k2 >     > kn and S(Gi) ⊂ [0,ki] for every i ∈ N. Moreover S(G1) ⊂ [0,k2].




αi(S − γ − αi) − αj(S − γ − αj)
= αi(S − γ − αi) − αiαj + αiαj − αj(S − γ − αj)








S − γ − αj
αj
S − γ − αi
=
αi(S − γ − αi)
αj(S − γ − αj)
> 1 (3)
11and hence ki < kj.
Now, for every i ∈ N and t ∈ (ki,∞)
πG

















Repeating the reasoning in Lemma 5, if Gi(ki) = Gi(k
+
i ) < 1, then player i can strictly
improve his payoﬀ by moving all the probability in (ki,∞) to 0. Therefore Gi(ki) = 1 for all
i ∈ N. For any j ∈ N\{1} we have k2 ≥ kj and hence Gj(k2) ≥ Gj(kj) = 1. So Gj(k2) = 1
and hence S(Gj) ⊂ [0,k2]. Now, because of Lemma 2 we conclude that S(G1) ⊂ [0,k2] as
well.
In the following lemma we show that pure strategy 0 belongs to the support of every
equilibrium strategy. Moreover, players 2,...,n play this strategy with positive probability.
Lemma 7. Let ΓS,α,δ be an n-player cake sharing game and let G = (Gi)i∈N ∈ GN be a
Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. Then 0 ∈ S(Gj) for every j ∈ N. Moreover Gj(0+) > 0 for
every j ∈ N\{1}.
Proof. Suppose 0 / ∈ S(Gi) for some i ∈ N. Let s > 0 be the smallest element in the closed
set S(Gi). Then [0,s) ∩ S(Gi) = ∅ and hence Gi(t) = 0 for every t ∈ [0,s]. Consequently
the function
πG







is strictly decreasing on [0,s] for every j ∈ N\{i}. Hence (0,s) ∩ S(Gj) = ∅ for every
j ∈ N\{i}. Choose s∗ ∈ (0,s). Then s∗ / ∈ S(Gj) for every j ∈ N. According to Lemma 3
we have (s∗,∞) ∩ S(Gi) = ∅, a contradiction with s ∈ S(Gi). So, 0 ∈ S(Gj) for every
j ∈ N.
Now suppose i ∈ N\{1} is such that Gi(0+) = 0. This implies that the function
πG












. According to Lemma 6 we have Gj(k2) = 1
for every j ∈ N. Hence
πG











αj) > α1 = πG
1 (0).
Due to continuity of πG
1 ( ) at 0 we have πG
1 (k2) > πG
1 (t) for every t ∈ [0,ε] with ε > 0
suﬃciently small. So, [0,ε) ∩ S(G1) = ∅, contradicting the fact that 0 ∈ S(G1).
The following lemma provides the equilibrium payoﬀs in a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 8. Let G = (Gi)i∈N be a Nash equilibrium of the n-player cake sharing game ΓS,α,δ









and ηj = αj for every j ∈ N\{1}.
Proof. According to Lemma 7 we have Gj(0+) > 0 for every j ∈ N\{1}. Hence ηj =
πG




j =2 αj . According to Lemma 6










If η1 > πG
1 (k2) then, by the continuity of πG
1 ( ) at k2, we infer that for γ > 0 suﬃciently
small we have η1 > πG
1 (t) for every t ∈ [k2 − γ,k2]. Hence S(G1) ⊆ [0,k2 − γ]. Now player
2 can obtain more than α2 by putting all his probability at k2 − γ + ǫ for ǫ > 0 small
enough.
In the following lemma we show that in a Nash equilibrium players 3,...,n claim their
initial right immediately, i.e., they play pure strategy 0.
Lemma 9. Let G = (Gi)i∈N be a Nash equilibrium of the n-player cake sharing game ΓS,α,δ





0 if t = 0
1 if t > 0
i.e., Gi corresponds to pure strategy 0.





0 if t = 0
1 if t > 0
Deﬁne t∗ = inf{t | Gi(t) = 1}. Note that t∗ > 0 and t∗ ∈ S(Gi). Moreover, by continuity
of Gi in t∗ we have Gi(t∗) = 1. Now we have
πG
2 (t∗) = δt
∗






Gj(t∗)) ≤ α2, (4)
since otherwise player 2 could deviate to pure strategy t∗ obtaining strictly more than his
equilibrium payoﬀ α2. Moreover, due to t∗ ∈ S(Gi),
πG
i (t∗) = δt
∗






Gj(t∗)) = αi, (5)




















Gj(t∗) = αi(1 − δt
∗
).








which leads to the conclusion that G2(t∗) > Gi(t∗) = 1, a contradiction.
As a consequence of the last result, the only possible Nash equilibrium in a cake sharing
game is one in which players 3,...,n play pure strategy 0 and players 1 and 2 play the
game with total cake size S −
 n
i=3 αi.





j =2 αj . Deﬁne G∗ = (G∗










if 0 ≤ t ≤ k2




           
           
0 if t = 0
α2(S −
 








if 0 < t ≤ k2






0 if t = 0
1 if t > 0
for every i ∈ {3,...,n}. Then G∗ is the unique Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ.
Proof. Suppose G = (Gi)i∈N ∈ GN is a Nash equilibrium of ΓS,α,δ. As a consequence of
Lemma 9 we have Gi = G∗
i for every i ∈ {3,...,n}, so players 3,...,n claim their initial
rights immediately. Now (G1,G2) is a Nash equilibrium of the 2-player cake sharing game
with cake size S −
 n
i=3 αi and initial right vector (α1,α2). According to Theorem 1 we
have G1 = G∗
1 and G2 = G∗
2. So G = G∗.
Now we show that G∗ is indeed a Nash equilibrium. Since, according to Theorem 1,
(G∗
1,G∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium of the 2-player cake sharing game with cake size S−
 n
i=3 αi
and initial right vector (α1,α2), players 1 and 2 can not gain by deviating unilaterally. Now
we show that players 3,...,n are not interested in deviating either. For this it is suﬃcient to
show that πG
∗
i (t) ≤ αi for every i ∈ {3,...,n} and every t ∈ [0,∞). So, let i ∈ {3,...,n}.
Then for every t ∈ [k2,∞) we have
πG
∗























j =i αj and at the last inequality we used the fact that ki < k2 (see
Lemma 6). Hence it is suﬃcient to show that πG
∗
i (t) ≤ αi for every t ∈ [0,k2]. Note that
for every t ∈ [0,k2] (also for t = 0!) we have
πG
∗














= δtαi + (α2 − α2δt)
α2(S −
 






































= aδt + bδ−t + c,
where































Making the change of variables x = δt note that it is suﬃcient to show that for the function
f : (0,∞) → I R, deﬁned by




we have f(x) ≤ αi for every x ∈ [δk2,1]. Since f′′(x) = 2b
x3 > 0 for every x ∈ [δk2,1], the
function f is convex on [δk2,1]. Consequently, f(x) ≤ max{f(δk2),f(1)}. Since f(1) =
a + b + c = αi and f(δk2) = πG
∗
i (k2) ≤ αi, this ﬁnishes the proof.
Remark 1. Throughout this paper we assumed that α1 < α2 <     < αn. Scrutinizing
the proofs of Lemmas 1-5 and Theorem 1 we may conclude that for 2-player cake sharing
games the same result (existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium) also holds in case
α1 = α2. For cake sharing games with at least three players the existence result is still valid
16in the more general case α1 ≤ α2 ≤     ≤ αn (and a Nash equilibrium is still provided by
the proﬁle described in Theorem 2). With few additional eﬀorts we can show that this Nash
equilibrium is unique if and only if α2 < α3.6
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